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Abstract
This is an editorial note to accompany reprinting as a Golden Oldie in
the Journal of General Relativity and Gravitation1 of the famous paper
by Brandon Carter on the anthropic principle in cosmology [8]. This
paper was presented at IAU Symposium No. 63, entitled Confrontation
of cosmological theories with observational data, in 1973.2
The anthropic principle is one of the most controversial proposals in cosmol-
ogy. It relates to why the universe is of such a nature as to allow the existence
of life. This inevitably engages with the foundations of cosmology, and has
philosophical as well as technical aspects. The literature on the topic is vast –
the Carter paper reprinted here [8] has 226 listed citations, and the Barrow and
Tipler book [3] has 1740. Obviously I can only pick up on a few of these papers
in this brief review of the impact of the paper.
While there were numerous previous philosophical treatises on the topic,
stretching back to speculations about the origin of the universe in ancient times
(see [3] for a magisterial survey), scientific proposals are more recent. A well
known one was biologist Alfred Russell Wallace, who wrote in 1904: “Such a
vast and complex universe as that which we know exists around us, may have
been absolutely required ... in order to produce a world that should be precisely
adapted in every detail for the orderly development of life culminating in man”
[46]. But that was before modern cosmology was established: the idea of the
expanding and evolving universe was yet to come.
Following on Weyl’s speculations on the fundamental physical constants in
1919, and Eddington’s work from 1923 on (summarised in his book [23]) hoping
to explain the numerical values of these constants,3 Dirac’s ruminations on the
large number coincidences between these constants [20] seem to have set the
ball rolling. He suggested [21] that these coincidences in the evolving universe
had to be explained by a time varying gravitational constant, else they would
only be true at one cosmic epoch.
1See http://www.mth.uct.ac.za/∼cwh/goldies.html.
2That republication will take place later this year.
3See pp.224 – 231 of [3] for detailed references.
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Robert Dicke [19] noted in 1961 that Dirac’s relation could be a selection ef-
fect related to the times when observers could exist, this in turn being related to
the values of the fundamental constants of physics which determine the lifetime
of main sequence stars. Dicke’s paper makes an explicit anthropic statement
in the cosmological context, based on an analysis of the parameters affecting
stellar lifetimes: “T [the age of the universe] is not a random choice from a wide
range of possible choices but is limited by the criteria for the possible existence
of physicists”.
Brandon Carter, then a postdoc at Cambridge University, mused on these
topics, being inspired to do so first by the discussion of Dirac’s work in Bondi’s
classic book Cosmology [4], and then by Dicke’s paper [19]. In 1967 he wrote a
preprint [7] systematically investigating the causal links between these constants
and both astronomical and physical phenomena, focusing first on the mass mN
of the nucleon and its relation to the electric charge e and the mass of the
electron me, and then including three more sufficient to determine ordinary
everyday physics (the strong interaction coupling constant gS , the pion mass
mpi, and the mass difference ∆N between the neutron and the proton) and three
relating to more exotic processes (the muon mass mµ, the electromagnetic mass
splitting ∆pi of the pion, and the weak coupling constant gW ). He commented
on some remarkable relations between these parameters (equations (6) – (8) of
[7]). He calculated many astrophysical consequences of these numbers, but did
not make any explicit anthropic link. A second preprint in 1968, that was less
widely circulated, made the anthropic link to their values in the context of an
ensemble of universes.4
This then opened the way for his conference talks on 21 February, 1970 at
a Clifford Centenary meeting in Princeton,5 and at an IAU Symposium hon-
ouring Copernicus’s 500th birthday held in Cracow from September 10 to 17,
1973 (both talks being at the invitation of John Wheeler). The latter talk was
published in the symposium proceedings in 1974 [8], which are reprinting as a
Golden Oldie. This definitively opened up the topic of the anthropic principle
as a subject for scientific discussion in the context of present day cosmological
theory. It was contemporaneous with a paper by Collins and Hawking, “Why is
the universe isotropic?” [16], that raised the same issue in the specific context
of Bianchi cosmologies. The authors were all at the same institution, so it was
the subject of discussion between them at that time; Carter’s work is referenced
in the Collins and Hawking paper, which in turn is referenced in Carter’s 1974
paper.
The Collins and Hawking paper was a specific application to the case of
Bianchi cosmologies, showing that only some Bianchi classes would be suitable
for life to develop. It states “One cannot explain the isotropy of the universe
without postulating special initial conditions ... we have to face the awkward
4This preprint is referred to in the Collins and Hawking paper ([16], p.319).
5 Carter, B. “Large Numbers in Astrophysics and Cosmology”. Paper presented at Clifford
Centennial Meet., Princeton (1970); unpublished. Referred to in [14].
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question, why is the universe isotropic?” Like Carter they consider an ensemble
of universes. After explaining that only in Bianchi universes that tend to become
isotropic are galaxies likely to form, the paper states
SAP (Collins and Hawking 1973): “Since it would seem that
existence of galaxies is a necessary condition for the development
of intelligent life, the answer to the question ‘why is the universe
isotropic?’ is ‘because we are here’ ”.
This statement appears to invert the expected direction of causality, and so led
to some suspicion about the anthropic principle in many circles; however it in
fact was to be seen as an explanatory proposal in the context of a multiverse
(which was mentioned earlier in the paper).
The physics based approach by Carter in his paper [8] opened up much inter-
est in the Anthropic Principle as a scientific method of explanation. In addition
to the mass of the protonmp, the mass of the electronme and the electric charge
e, like Dicke he introduced the Hubble expansion rate H (closely related to the
age of the universe ≃ H−1), and related these to other cosmological parameters
and conditions required for the existence of observers. He characterised the
Weak Anthropic Principle (used by Dicke in [19]) as follows:
WAP (Carter 1974): “We must be prepared to take account of
the fact that our location in the universe is necessarily privileged to
the extent of being compatible with our existence as observers.”
Thus it is seen as an observational selection effect in a universe that is biofriendly;
it relates to where and when we can exist in such a universe (“location” refers
to time as well as space), and is to be seen as a contrast to the Copernican
principle (all places are to be regarded as equivalent). He then proposed the
Strong Anthropic Principle, relating to severe restrictions on the fundamental
parameters of the universe itself if life is to exist:
SAP (Carter 1974): “The universe (and hence the fundamen-
tal parameters on which it depends) must be such as to admit the
creation of observers within it at some stage”.
This sounds like the Collins and Hawking statement. But this was intended as
a prediction, not an explanation; it took the existence of observers for granted,
and made deductions on that basis. However he then introduced the idea that
an ensemble of universes was necessary in order that the conditions for life to
exist could be explained in a probabilistic way:
SAP+ (Carter 1974) “It is of course philosophically possible – as
a last resort, when no stronger physical argument is available – to
promote a prediction based on the strong anthropic principle to the
status of an explanation by thinking in terms of a ‘world ensemble’.”
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This is the most common interpretation of the principle at the present time.
The topic was developed further in an important paper by Carr and Rees
[14], broadening the set of relationships between the constants considered. The
abstract of that paper states, “The basic features of galaxies, stars, planets and
the everyday world are essentially determined by a few microphysical constants
and by the effects of gravitation. Many interrelations between different scales
that at first sight seem surprising are straightforward consequences of simple
physical arguments. But several aspects of our Universe – some of which seem
to be prerequisites for the evolution of any form of life – depend rather delicately
on apparent ’coincidences’ among the physical constants.” A similar discussion
was given later by Davies [17]. This suggests that there is something needing
explaining, unless these bio-friendly relations were just coincidences – but sci-
entific progress often lies in showing that what at first seem like coincidences
are in fact necessary relations.
The topic was then picked up in a Royal Society discussion meeting on the
constants of nature organised in 1983 by W H McCrea, where Carter stated the
strong principle as follows:
SAP (Carter 1983): “Our mere existence as intelligent observers
imposes restrictions not merely on our situation, but even on the
general properties of the universe including the values of the funda-
mental parameters”. [9]
This version again is not an explanation, but a deduction from the fact of our
existence. Carter explained that this did not imply that life was probable; he
predicted that the occurrence of observers would be rare, even on environmen-
tally favorable planets such as ours.
The topic was then presented in an encyclopaedic way in the book by Bar-
row and Tipler [3], covering old design arguments, modern teleology, various
Anthropic principles, and their relation to quantum mechanics and biochem-
istry. This book became a major reference in the area and made it widely
known. It interpreted the Weak Anthropic Principle as a selection effect: “any
cosmological observations made by astronomers are biassed by an all-embracing
selection effect: our own existence” ([3], pp.15 – 16), but this selection effect is
interpreted in a multiverse setting (p.19). Their version of the SAP (p.21) is
essentially the same as Carter’s 1974 version. They introduced two further ver-
sions: Wheeler’s controversial Participatory Anthropic Principle (PAP), based
on his interpretation of quantum theory: “Observers are necessary to bring the
universe into being”; and their own Final Anthropic Principle:
FAP (Barrow and Tippler 1986): “Intelligent information-processing
must come into existence in the Universe, and, once it comes into
existence, it will never die out.”
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These two inclusions somewhat discredited an otherwise very fine volume. In his
famous review of the book [27], Martin Gardner ridiculed the FAP by quoting
the last two sentences of the book, which he characterized as representing the
Completely Ridiculous Anthropic Principle (CRAP). These versions (PAP and
FAP) have now faded into obscurity.
The publication of this book opened the floodgates for more philosophically
based discussions as well as popular presentations (e.g. [22, 35, 42, 39, 29, 18, 5]).
An excellent survey article was written by Balashov [1], with extensive references
up to 1991. The more the issue of fine tuning was investigated, the more pressing
it became. Rees for example [39] argued that anthropic reasoning is needed to
explain the fine-tuned values of six constants required for life to exist:
• N ≃ 1036: the strength of the electrical forces that hold electrons and
protons together to form atoms, divided by the force of gravity between
them;
• ǫ ≃ 0.007: defining how strongly atomic nuclei bind together;
• Ωm ≃ 0.3: the actual density of the universe expressed in terms of the
critical density required for it to eventually recollapse in the future, if
there is no cosmological constant;
• ΩΛ ≃ 0.7: The energy density of the cosmological constant, similarly
expressed as a dimensionless ratio;
• Q ≃ 10−5: The fractional density of the fluctuations in the early universe
that were seeds of structure formation via gravitational attraction;
• D = 3: the number of spatial dimensions in our world (at macroscopic
scales).
The constants N , ǫ and D govern the fundamental interactions of physics; Ωm,
ΩΛ and Q govern the expansion of the universe and the growth of structures
in it. These are not the only parameters that have to be fine tuned, for ex-
ample the proton-neutron mass difference is not listed here. The interactions
between physical constants are complex, and indeed it is not clear which should
be thought of as fundamental (see [29, 2, 44, 45]); for example these parameters
are not precisely the same as those discussed by Carter [7, 8], although they are
related.
Although the evidence for fine tuning was accumulating, the anthropic prin-
ciple project was initially not widely accepted: it was regarded as a philosophical
oddity in cosmology, not really related to physics. It became much more widely
accepted as a result of three developments.
Firstly, there was a growing appreciation of the major problem of the mag-
nitude of the cosmological constant, when considered as the vacuum energy of
quantum fields. Simple quantum field theory calculation suggest it should be
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many orders of magnitude larger then the measured value [48]. This is a major
problem for theoretical physics, because this prediction arises from a plausible
combination of two of our most successful theories, namely general relativity
and quantum field theory. This has crucial implications for astrophysics be-
cause a value much larger than observed would prevent galaxy formation, and
hence would result in a lifeless universe. A multiverse solution seemed almost
the only way out [47, 48].
Secondly, the proposal of chaotic inflation [36] arose as a variant of Guth’s
inflationary universe proposal, and this seemed to provide a natural setting for
existence of many disconnected expanding universe domains that could have
different effective physical constants in each of them. This could reasonably be
considered a physical mechanism for realization of a ‘multiverse’, as originally
envisaged by Carter [8] and Collins and Hawking [16].
Thirdly, the proposal of the landscape of string theory arose as a physics
setting within which variation of effective constants might naturally arise [40,
41]. The huge number of string vacua posited in that theory provided a setting
whereby the effective constants of physics could be different in different domains
such as occur in chaotic inflation.
Together these ideas gave a coherent explanation of an otherwise troubling
issue: why does the cosmological constant have a small value that allows life to
exist? Once one has this theoretical setting, one can apply the same explanation
to any other of the ‘fundamental’ physical constants that need fine tuning in or-
der that life can exist, such as those mentioned by Rees [39]: they too can arise
from a deeper theory (M-Theory) that allows each of them to have values that
vary with position in a multiverse. One can even suggest that in this way, the
anthropic principle is indispensible for making sense of the hypothesized land-
scape of superstring theory (Brandon Carter, private communication). However
one should note that the basic mechanism for eternal inflation does not of itself
cause physics to be different in each domain in a multiverse. This supposed vari-
ation is not a necessary conclusion arising from the straightforward conjunction
of the physics of chaotic inflation and M theory; but it can be the outcome if
one extends the theory by adding extra assumptions.
Proponents of the SAP in its explanatory form include Andrei Linde, Martin
Rees, Stephen Weinberg, and Leonard Susskind, but others such as Roger Pen-
rose, David Gross, and Lee Smolin disagree. Various authors (including Aguirre,
Bostrom, Carr, Carter, Davies, Dimopoulos, Donoghue, Hartle, Hogan, Kallosh,
Linde, Page, Rees, Smolin, Stoeger, Susskind, Vilenkin, Weinberg, and Wilczek)
summarize their views on anthropic proposals in [6]. A recent review of the prin-
ciple by Carter is [10].
Various criticisms have been made of the proposal; I summarize them as
follows:
First, Carter [10] has regretted his use of the word “anthropic”, because it
conveys the impression that the principle involves only humans, rather than
general intelligent observers; others have commented that the term is mislead-
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ing because the usual calculations have nothing directly to do with humans, but
refer only to complex atoms or stars and planets. However these remarks do
not detract from the fact that the principle as commonly used relates to real
restrictions that will plausibly apply to existence of any materially-based form
of intelligent life, and hence is indeed an interesting topic of discussion. Never-
theless if one is to seriously contemplate the relation of physics to the origin of
life, one does need to relate the theory to biological realities [9, 10].
Second, there has been criticism that the word “principle” is not justified in
describing what are in fact just selection effects, or indeed perhaps tautologies.
However selection effects play a crucial role in science, and are far from trivial;
and in particular, examining the consequences of changes in the fundamental
constants for existence of life is a useful and complex task. It certainly does
succeed in showing that the physical conditions required for the existence of life
are very special relative to what might conceivably have been [25].
Third, the explanatory form of SAP has been criticized by many physicists
as simply giving up on physical explanation. Penrose states it thus:6 “It tends
to be invoked by theorists whenever they do not have a good enough theory to
explain the observed facts.” [38]. The force of this argument lies in the fact
that a multiverse proposal can be used to explain virtually anything, so it has
almost no predictive power. I return to this issue in a moment.
Fourthly, the results obtained in this way are completely dependent on the
measure used. Different (equally plausible) ways of assigning probabilities to
candidate universes lead to totally different anthropic predictions. For example,
Trotta and Starkman [43] present an explicit example based on the total number
of possible observations observers can carry out, and conclude that in absence of
a fundamental motivation for selecting one weighting scheme over another, the
anthropic principle cannot be used to explain the value of Λ. The issue of the
measure in a multiverse is unresolved, and is the subject of an ongoing debate.
Related to this, anthropic bounds obtained on physical constants depend on the
specific choice of the theory. For example, Ref. [28] claims that you can have a
life-supporting universe (with carbon-12) without the weak interactions.
Finally, the physical existence or not of multiverse is basically untestable
[25], but is an essential component in the explanatory use of the SAP; so it
is not clear if this can truly be regarded as a scientific theory, rather than a
philosophical principle. The issue is debated in the articles in [6].
Given these criticisms, how does it fare as regards the acid test: Can it make
new predictions, or only retrospectively justify known relationships? There
are two cases where this kind of reasoning may be claimed to have made new
predictions, rather than post hoc justifying relations that we already knew.
Firstly, a remarkable pioneering paper by Fred Hoyle made a crucial observa-
tion regarding nuclear reactions required to create carbon-12 in helium-burning
red giant stars [30, 31]. In order to create the observed abundance of carbon,
6This and other useful quotes are given in an extensive article on the anthropic principle
in Wikipedia.
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the triple-alpha process required an excited resonant state of carbon-12 with
an energy level of 7.68 Mev ([31], p.134). The existence of the Hoyle state was
experimentally confirmed shortly after by Willie Fowler; new data on the state
is still being obtained today [15]. Since carbon is crucial to the existence of life
as we know it, and indeed probably for existence of any physical living beings
(because there seems to be no alternative to polypeptide chains for creating
molecules of the required complexity), one can legitimately regard existence of
Hoyle’s energy level as an anthropic requirement. Hoyle himself did not make
that link at the time of his discovery, but seems to have done so later [34]; one
can claim that anthropic requirements predict existence of this state. This is an
instance of use of SAP to make a prediction, as originally proposed by Carter in
his 1974 paper. However it has since been related to values of the fine structure
constant [24]; this enables proposal of an anthropic explanation of the nature of
the Hoyle state.
Secondly, an intriguing line of argument by Weinberg and collaborators [37]
is that, due to a ‘Principle of Mediocrity’ espoused by Vilenkin, Λ is not likely
to be much smaller than the limit allowing galaxies to form. On this basis
they concluded that if ΩΛ turned out to be much less than 0.6, anthropic rea-
soning could not explain why it was so small. This was at a time when work
by Efstathiou and others suggested that Λ was positive, but the definitive su-
pernova and CMB data putting the value at ΩΛ ≃ 0.7 was not yet available.
This almost counts as an anthropic prediction of something as yet unknown (in
reviewing this argument more recently [49], Weinberg states that the observed
value is still a bit low relative to this anthropic prediction). This is an example
of use of SAP as an explanatory principle, but depends on the additional as-
sumption of the Principle of Mediocrity – an unverifiable philosophical principle.
Taken together, these two cases show that the anthropic principle can po-
tentially provide new predictions that can be experimentally tested. It is thus
not always simply philosophy or tautology. However one must be cautious here:
agreement with such predictions is supporting evidence for the multiverse hy-
pothesis as an explanation, but does not amount to a proof that it is correct.
If hypothesis M (existence of a multiverse) leads to prediction L (some range
of values for Λ), it is simple logic that observation of L does not necessarily
imply validity ofM (this is only true if there is no other possible causeM1 that
also implies L). Furthermore, because this is only a probabilistic claim based
on a further philosophical assumption, (not L) does not imply (not M): indeed
no value of the cosmological constant can either prove or disprove existence of
a multiverse, which is the crucial element in use of the anthropic principle for
explanatory purposes. Nevertheless the Weinberg argument certainly makes it
more plausible: it provides legitimate supporting evidence.
The need for the strong version of the anthropic principle would drop away
if ever fundamental physics attained a foundational theory uniquely predicting
the correct values of all the fundamental constants (which do of course allow
life to exist) [10]. But this would not solve the anthropic mystery, as some have
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claimed [32], rather it would deepen it by changing its locus to a more funda-
mental level. What possible explanation could one then give for why theoretical
physics principles (variational principles, specific symmetry groups, etc) would
necessarily lead to the existence of life? It is not clear how the issue could
be tackled then, even in principle. We are however apparently saved from this
dilemma because our best approach to developing a fundamental theory of all
forces (M-Theory) is presently heading in the opposite direction, by predicting
more and more possible quantum vacua and associated effective theories [40, 41].
The needed uniqueness is eluding us.
The anthropic principle continues to be the subject of much controversy
today, some regarding it as a crucial foundational principle for cosmological
argumentation, and others as giving up on science. The debate continues. Its
current application as an explanatory principle is intimately tied in with the
multiverse hypothesis. As this is observationally untestable, one can argue that
it is a philosophical rather than strictly scientific proposal; but as such, it is a
very productive hypothesis, leading to many interesting investigations. It deals
with deep issues, and it will not go away.
Despite what is often claimed by its proponents, the anthropic principle
used in this way does not solve issues of ultimate explanation; it only postpones
them. If this hypothesis is indeed true, this simply leads to the next step in the
argument: Why this particular multiverse? Why any multiverse? How do the
‘laws’ governing the multiverse arise? Where do they reside? And why are their
governing constants what they are?
Carter’s role in all of this was crucial: the paper [10] initiated the vibrant
discussion on this topic as a scientific as opposed to purely philosophical enter-
prise. However as is often the case,7 after a relatively short while it was replaced
as a primary reference by other publications, and particularly (as is evidenced
by the citation figures quoted at the start of this review essay) by the Barrow
and Tipler book [3]. Carter himself moved on to discuss biological issues and the
probability of life in the universe, stating [9] “The evidence suggests the evolu-
tionary chain included at least one but probably not more than two links which
were highly improbable (a priori) in the time available” . He regarded this as
an important result: in his 2004 review [10], he states “The example that seems
to me most important was provided by the prediction [9] that the occurrence of
anthropic observers would be rare, even on environmentally favorable planets
such as ours”. Hence it is not enough to talk about carbon or galaxies as being
equivalent to the existence of observes (humans); one needs to look at biological
issues. One specific issue here is whether the anthropic principle solves the cru-
cial unsolved problem of how the DNA code was created. It has been claimed
by Eugene Koonin that it can do so in the context of eternal inflation because
of the infinities proposed in that theory [33], but this is a controversial claim
7Einstein’s article “The Foundation of The General Theory of Relativity” in Annalen der
Physik 49 (1916) has only 246 citations recorded in Google Scholar and 320 according to
SPIRES.
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because those infinities are never realised in a finite time [26].
Carter later formulated an anthropic interpretation of quantum theory based
on a microanthropic principle [11, 12] relating to the foundations of quantum
physics. This has not made the same impact as the other versions. He is cur-
rently working on issues to do with future and past of life on earth, considered
in the light of anthropic measures of hominid and other terrestrial species [13].
I thank Jean-Philippe Uzan and Jean-Pierre Lasota-Hirszowicz for helpful
comments on an earlier version of this comment.
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